In Central Hungary, this battle, which halted the Ottoman advance and encouraged the Russian Tsar to go to war, played a significant role in the Ottomans' Second Siege of Vienna.

Grand Vizier Köprülüzade Fazıl Mustafa Pasha, having been left in power, continued on his way. It was learned in Belgrade that a large Austrian army was located around Salankamen. Despite the suggestion from military leaders to wait for provincial forces and Tatar units, the grand vizier decided to move to Salankamen. On August 19, 1691, as the Ottoman army suddenly attacked, the Austrian army of 50,000 infantry and 50,000 cavalry under Prince Louis, having learned of the Ottoman shortcomings, also entered the battle. Despite the heavy losses inflicted by the Ottoman artillery, the numerically superior enemy advanced rapidly, and hand-to-hand combat took place in the trenches. The Austrian army, which began to falter due to the fierce resistance of the Ottoman soldiers, was saved from collapse when the grand vizier, who was fighting heroically at the front lines to boost morale, was shot in the forehead and killed. With the loss of its commander, the panicked and undisciplined Ottoman army suffered an unexpected defeat. Thus, the Ottomans, who were on the verge of victory, were forced to withdraw to Belgrade, leaving their supplies on the battlefield. However, the Austrian army could not pursue the Ottomans, likely due to the destruction of an 800-boat fleet providing logistical support to the Austrian forces on the Danube by the Ottoman navy. In the spring of 1692, Ali Pasha launched a campaign but limited himself to fortifying Belgrade due to the lack of battle. The probable reason for the absence of war was Austria's renewed conflict with France. This situation is also explained by Austria's peace initiatives through British and Dutch envoys. However, as both sides' offers were unacceptable, no peace was achieved, and when Austria besieged Belgrade again the following year, the war resumed. The new grand vizier, Bozoklu Mustafa Pasha, headed towards Transylvania in 1693, but upon hearing of the siege, he redirected his forces to Belgrade. Upon hearing this, Austria, not wanting to face the Ottoman army supported by the Crimean Khan and Imre Thököly, had to lift the siege that had lasted for 36 to 37 days. Thus, Belgrade, saved from the siege, was re-equipped and reinforced.1

The following year (1694), the Ottoman army, under the command of Sürmeli Ali Pasha, once again moved into action and dared to besiege Petrovaradin by land and river. However, the siege was lifted due to enemy attacks on ships bringing ammunition and supplies, the approaching winter season, and trenches filling with water. The army withdrew to Belgrade.2

Thus, during the reign of Ahmed II, the most significant success in the wars with Austria was the saving of Belgrade. When Mustafa ascended the throne, he was determined to overshadow this success. Less than a week after taking the throne, he announced his intention to personally lead a campaign against Austria. On June 30, 1695, he set out from Edirne to Belgrade. The war council assembled there decided to capture fortresses such as Lugos, Lipova, and Sebes. Lipova was conquered in a short time thanks to the fall of nearby fortresses. In fact, this was a fortress that Austria had been fortifying and guarding for four years. The capture of Lipova boosted morale in the army. Following this easy conquest, it was decided to take Lugos as well. When the governor of Rumelia, Mahmud Pasha, encountered a larger force than expected, the sultan redirected his main army there. Indeed, a great battle took place near Lugos, and in just three hours, the Ottoman army achieved a decisive victory. With these conquests, the Ottomans won their first major victory since the Second Siege of Vienna. At the end of the battle, 12 cannons, countless rifles, and a large amount of ammunition and supplies were seized as spoils of war. In addition, the Austrian commander, General Veterani, was killed while fleeing during the battle. The fortresses of Lugos and subsequently Sebes were demolished.3

The following year (1696), during the campaign season, Mustafa II set out once again for Austria. There was an interesting aspect to this campaign. As there was no money in the state treasury for campaign preparations, those in the state apparatus who could afford it were ordered to provide soldiers at their own expense. It was also deemed appropriate for the first time for 1,500 guards from the Bostancı Corps to participate in the campaign. This practice actually documented the dire state the empire had fallen into. The army, formed in this manner, set out towards Temesvar upon receiving news that it was besieged by Austrian forces. Although the Austrian army lifted the siege and withdrew, the Ottomans pursued them and forced them into battle at a place called Ulaş. Since the Austrian army was in retreat, they were unable to regroup and suffered heavy losses. After securing victory, the army fortified Temesvar and returned to Belgrade and then Edirne.4

Mustafa II was determined to bring Austria to its knees. Thus, the following year (April 1697), he set out for Austria for the third time. This time, there was a difference of opinion among the military leaders, with some believing that besieging Peterwardein was essential for the safety of Belgrade, while others argued that the siege would be difficult. Despite warnings from the future prominent Belgrade governor, Amcazade Hüseyin Pasha, the latter opinion prevailed. Historian Raşid Efendi, who followed and wrote about these discussions, noted that the first view was more accurate, as the second option involved crossing several rivers, such as Timiș, Bega, and Tisza. Another concern of those advocating the first opinion was the possibility of being ambushed while crossing the rivers. Moreover, "divisions and disputes" within the army were also learned by the enemy through spies. Indeed, the feared scenario occurred. While the Ottoman army was crossing the Tisza River near Zenta, they were ambushed by Austrian forces under the command of Prince Eugene. Only one-eighth of the army had crossed the river. Among them were Grand Vizier Elmas Mehmed, 13 valuable provincial governors, and hundreds of beys and janissary officers. Despite all measures taken and the heroic fighting of the army, they could not hold against the Austrian army, which was six times larger, and were defeated. This army was completely lost. As the bridge over the river was destroyed, the main Ottoman army could do nothing but watch and pray from afar for those who had crossed (September 11, 1697).5

This defeat marked a turning point in the fate of the Ottoman Empire. The internal disputes within the army were the main reason for this defeat. Taken during a period of Ottoman superiority over the Austrians since the reign of Ahmed II, this defeat not only negatively affected the morale of the Ottoman army but also emboldened the young but experienced Prime Minister Prince Eugene and his army and other allies. In addition, the army, assembled with great difficulty, suffered heavy losses, including 74 cannons, three double-barreled howitzers, and over 500 supply wagons. With this defeat, the Ottoman advance in Central Hungary came to a halt, and hopes of reclaiming lost territories were dashed. The sultan also never returned to the front. Another significant development was the decision of the young Russian Tsar Peter, emboldened by this defeat, to declare war on the Ottomans.

FOOTNOTES

1-Silahtar, II, p. 685.
2-Silahtar II, p. 750
3-5 Uzunçarşılı, Ottoman History, III/1, pp. 558-59
4-Uzunçarşılı, Ottoman History, III/1, pp. 562-63.

5 Uzunçarşılı, Ottoman History, III/1, p. 566